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Abstract
Monothematic delusions involve a single theme, and often occur in the absence of a 
more general delusional belief system. They are cognitively atypical insofar as they 
are said to be held in the absence of evidence, are resistant to correction, and have 
bizarre contents. Empiricism about delusions has it that anomalous experience is 
causally implicated in their formation, whilst rationalism has it that delusions result 
from top down malfunctions from which anomalous experiences can follow. Within 
empiricism, two approaches to the nature of the abnormality/abnormalities involved 
have been touted by philosophers and psychologists. One-factor approaches have it 
that monothematic delusions are a normal response to anomalous experiences whilst 
two-factor approaches seek to identify a clinically abnormal pattern of reasoning in 
addition to anomalous experience to explain the resultant delusion. In this paper we 
defend a one-factor approach. We begin by making clear what we mean by atypi-
cal, abnormal, and factor. We then identify the phenomenon of interest (monothe-
matic delusion) and overview one and two-factor empiricism about its formation. 
We critically evaluate the cases for various second factors, and find them all want-
ing. In light of this we turn to our one-factor account, identifying two ways in which 
‘normal response’ may be understood, and how this bears on the discussion of one-
factor theories up until this point. We then conjecture that what is at stake is a cer-
tain view about the epistemic responsibility of subjects with delusions, and the role 
of experience, in the context of familiar psychodynamic features. After responding 
to two objections, we conclude that the onus is on two-factor theorists to show that 
the one-factor account is inadequate. Until then, the one-factor account ought to be 
understood as the default position for explaining monothematic delusion forma-
tion and retention. We don’t rule out the possibility that, for particular subjects with 
delusions there may be a second factor at work causally implicated in their delusory 
beliefs but, until the case for the inadequacy of the single factor is made, the second 
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factor is redundant and fails to pick out the minimum necessary for a monothematic 
delusion to be present.
Keywords Monothematic delusion · One-factor · Two-factor · Rationality · 
Epistemic responsibility · Normal range · Anomalous experience
1  Preliminaries
Delusional cognition is atypical, insofar as it uncommon among human believ-
ers. Indeed, its atypicality is part of its interest: why do only some folk hold such 
beliefs? We will see later that the two-factor theorist has motivated her theory by 
appeal to the atypicality of delusional belief within the set of folk with particular 
anomalous experiences (Sects. 3, 5). Atypicality is understood by appeal to what is 
abnormal. Where one-factor theorists only appeal to one abnormality (anomalous 
experience) in explaining delusional belief, two-factor theories claim we need to 
appeal to two (anomalous experience plus some bias, deficit, or performance error 
in mechanisms of belief production or evaluation). At the outset, we can distin-
guish two understandings of abnormality: statistical and functional.1 The difference 
between them can be seen with the following example. Suppose that a particular 
reasoning style, R, occurs in all and only folk with delusions. Suppose also that R 
is functionally normal, which is to be understood as within the range of reasoning 
styles between which evolutionary selection has not distinguished. Two-factor theo-
rists proceeding on the basis of statistical abnormality would take R to be a second 
abnormality, whilst those interested in functional abnormality would not. We take it 
that identifying a functional abnormality which afflicts those with delusions is more 
difficult than identifying a statistical one (since the former would require an inde-
pendent account of functional normality). The literature has not been clear on the 
notion of normality at stake, but one reasonable interpretation is to understand two-
factor theorists as seeking to identify a functional abnormality against a statistical 
assumption (viz. that these functional abnormalities are also statistically abnormal). 
Often some departure from rational standards of belief formation and evaluation is 
taken as a sign of functional abnormality. However, it is possible for subjects to be 
statistically abnormal in forming or evaluating beliefs by adhering more closely to 
these standards. Since two-factor theorists often object to one-factor theorists on the 
grounds that there is some irrationality in the formation or evaluation of the distinc-
tive thematic beliefs of a subject with delusions, irrationality is a potentially distinct 
source of abnormality: involving significant departure from standards of rationality. 
We proceed by understanding the two-factor claim under the interpretation indicated 
with this qualification concerning the possibility of the second source.
1 We mean the teleological/historical sense of ‘functional’ here, propounded by e.g. Ruth Millikan 
(1984), Karen Neander (1991), and others, and not e.g. Robert Cummins’s (1975) causal role sense or 
Christopher Boorse’s (1976) goal contribution sense.
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Finally, we use the idea of a factor in the following way: a factor is something which 
is different between subjects with delusions and subjects without, something which is 
relevant to the project of explaining delusional belief in particular. It is for this reason 
that the second factor (or the way in which it is present) must be unique to folk with 
delusions; it is an abnormality that explains the formation of abnormal beliefs. This is 
something recognized by two-factor theorists. Martin Davies and colleagues for exam-
ple take the second factor to be ‘a departure from what is normally the case’ (2005, p. 
228); Ryan McKay and colleagues understand the deficit two-factor approach as one 
which ‘conceptualises delusions as involving dysfunction or disruption in ordinary 
cognitive processes’ (2010, pp. 316–317); and Tony Stone and Andrew Young talk 
of delusional reasoning being ‘abnormal’, and ‘differences between people with and 
without delusions’ (1997, p. 342). Where continuities with subjects without delusions 
are recognized, two-factor theorists still urge that subjects with monothematic delu-
sions lie at the extreme end (McKay et al., 2010, pp. 316–317). We flag this option 
with our talk of the way in which the second factor is present.
The objective in the debate between one- and two-factor theorists is not to map 
every causal contribution to delusion formation. One-factor theories have been 
underestimated when this is forgotten. We do not deny that there might be particular 
reasoning styles involved in delusion formation; we only deny that such influences 
must be cognitive abnormalities. Where particular cases might involve abnormali-
ties of this kind, it would be a mistake to generalize that finding to monothematic 
delusions simpliciter (Sect.4.4).
2  Monothematic delusion
Both of the most recent editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM IV, 2000, DSM V, 2013) define delusion in a way that makes it seem 
like a cognitive disorder: a belief is held ‘despite clear or reasonable contradictory 
evidence regarding its veracity’ (DSM V, 2013, p. 87). Philosophers and psychol-
ogists have similarly honed in on the supposed poor epistemic status of delusions, 
describing them as cases in which the belief is ‘unresponsive to considerations of 
plausibility and evidence’ (e.g. Davies & Davies, 2009, p. 285, cf. Flores, 2021).
Localized brain damage has been suggested as a source of the distinctive mono-
thematic character of these delusions (Coltheart et al., 2007). Within a more com-
plex delusory framework, it has seemed possible to focus upon particular elements 
of a subject’s belief system and look into the explanation for why those are present. 
We take up this framework for the purposes of discussion, though do not rule out 
the possibility that a successful treatment of monothematic delusions will extend to 
polythematic cases. We need not settle the matter here because discussion of mono-
thematic delusions in particular originally motivated two-factor theories (e.g. Stone 
& Young, 1997, pp. 329–330).
The present debate between one- and two-factor theorists rests upon the assump-
tion that monothematic delusions are beliefs. We are concerned with the question of 
how these beliefs are formed and maintained. Though the doxastic status of delu-
sions is far from settled (for dissent see Currie, 2000; Egan, 2009; Dub, 2017), we 
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think that the case for doxasticism has been made persuasively elsewhere (Stone & 
Young, 1997, pp. 351–360; Bayne & Pacherie, 2005, Bortolotti, 2009, 2012).
Although delusions are conceived of as beliefs strongly resistant to counterevi-
dence, most monothematic delusions are accompanied by some highly distinctive 
anomalous experiences which, themselves, constitute an, at least, apparent source of 
evidence in their own right for the beliefs in question. We will defend an empiricist 
account according to which the only clinically abnormal feature of subjects with delu-
sions is their anomalous experiences. We deny that there need be a clinically abnormal 
feature at the cognitive level that explains the presence of monothematic delusions.
The table below gives various examples of monothematic delusions identifying 
the distinctive beliefs and hypothesized anomalous experiences at work.
Name Belief Experience
Delusions of Misidentification
Capgras An identified loved one has been 
replaced by an imposter
Lack of affective response to 
familiar people
Fregoli An identified familiar person is 
disguised as others following me 
around
Affective response to unfamiliar 
people
Mirrored self-misidentification The person I see reflected in the 
mirror is not me but somebody 
who looks very like me
Lack of experiencing the image 
in the mirror as oneself or mir-
ror agnosia (taking the image in 
the mirror as presenting figures 
through a window)
Delusions of self-consciousness
Cotard I am dead Lack of affective response, possibly 
generalised to environment
Somatoparaphrenia Something which is, in fact, a 
part of my body (e.g. an arm) is 
not a part of my body
Lack of experience of limb as part 
of body image
Anosognosia I can move a limb (when in fact 
I cannot)
Absence of experience of motoric 
failure
Other delusions
Erotomania An identified person is in love 
with me
?
Reverse othello My lover has remained faithful to 
me (after e.g. abandonment)
?
Those delusions concerning which there is a question mark over the anomalous 
experience we return to at the end (Sect. 6).
3  One‑ and two‑factor empiricism
All empiricists about monothematic delusion take the presence of anomalous experi-
ences to be an important part of their explanation. Specific anomalous experiences 
provide an immediate explanation of their monothematic character (i.e. delusional 
beliefs are constrained to topics to which the anomalous experience is relevant). 
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Heightened affective responsiveness to most faces is plausibly an important part of an 
explanation of the development of Fregoli delusion, the belief that one is being fol-
lowed by known but disguised people (Davies & Coltheart, 2000, pp. 31–32, Davies 
et al., 2001, p. 136). Absent affective responses in the experience of somebody one 
knows well is an important part of the explanation of the Capgras delusion that that 
person has been replaced by an imposter. One-factor accounts such as, most promi-
nently, Brendan Maher’s, hold that these experiences are the sole clinically abnor-
mal cause of monothematic delusions, and that monothematic delusions are a normal 
response to such anomalous experiences (Maher, 1974, 1988, 1999, 2003, 2006).
Two-factor approaches are in disagreement with Maher’s approach while building 
upon his insight. Whilst granting the importance of anomalous experience, they take 
a second factor to be required to explain the resultant delusion. All two-factor theo-
rists argue that if a one-factor theory were true, then every subject who had the rele-
vant anomalous experience would have the delusional belief. But this is not the case. 
So they reason that there must be some other causal factor involved (see e.g. Garety, 
1991, p. 15; Garety et al., 1991, pp. 194–195, Chapman and Chapman, 1988, p. 174; 
Davies & Coltheart, 2000, pp. 11–12; Davies et  al., 2001, p. 144; Young and De 
Pauw, 2002, p. 56; Davies et al., 2005, pp. 224–225; Coltheart, 2015, p. 23).
The claim that there are subjects without delusions who suffer the same anoma-
lous experiences as those with delusions is contestable. Maher himself claimed that 
the kinds of experience subjects with delusions have are ‘much more intense and pro-
longed’ (Maher, 1999, p. 566), and are ‘repeated or continue over an extended period’ 
(Maher, 2006, p. 182). The thought is that if a subject really does have an anomalous 
experience of this sort, she will go onto develop the corresponding delusion.
Support for this is found in studies of ordinary subjects who undergo artificially 
induced anomalous experience in a laboratory setting, and show signs of delusion-
like thinking in their experience reports. Maher refers to a study by Torsten Inge-
mann Nielsen (1963b) in his discussion of this. Participants were given manipulated 
feedback about the movements they made with their hands, in some trials the feed-
back reflected the movements of the participants’ hand, and in other trials it did not. 
In trials in which the hand seen behaved in ways which did not reflect the partici-
pants’ movements, many participants explained the perceived discrepancy ‘in terms 
strongly reminiscent of delusion explanations’ (Maher, 2006, p. 182). Only two of 
twenty-eight participants guessed that an artificial hand was involved. Examples of 
delusion-like explanation include: ‘It seems that my hand was moved by magnet-
ism or electricity; I began to wonder if it was happening because I am homosexual; 
I was hypnotized; My hand was controlled by an outside physical force—I don’t 
know what it was but I could feel it’ (Nielsen, 1963b, cited in Maher, 2006, p. 182).2 
Maher takes from this that even brief and unrepeated anomalous experiences often 
2 The published work reporting on the study which Maher cites here does not include all of the experi-
ence reports (in particular, the one citing homosexuality). Nielsen published another paper in the same 
year in Danish, reporting on an earlier but similar experiment, with an English summary (1963a). We 
think that Maher may have had access to the Danish transcripts from one of these studies, which was 




prompt delusion-like explanations, which supports the claim that when such experi-
ences are ‘more intense and prolonged’ (Maher, 1999, p. 566), they are sufficient for 
delusion formation. Putative cases of non-delusional subjects with the same anoma-
lous experiences as those which gives rise to delusion in other subjects are in fact 
cases in which the experience is lacking in some respect (intensity, duration, etc.). 
It is these differences in the experiences which explains the difference between the 
delusional and non-delusional subjects, and not some further cognitive deficit, bias, 
or performance error characterizing only the former.
There is also debate over whether particular candidates of similar experiences at 
work are really ones in which this is so. For instance, Max Coltheart observes that the 
absence of autonomic responses taken to be indicative of anomalous experiences in 
Capgras subjects are also present in subjects with ventromedial lesions yet the latter 
do not suffer delusions (Tranel et al., 1995; Coltheart, 2007, pp. 1048–1049). How-
ever, as Sam Wilkinson has pointed out, the lesions are in different areas. Capgras 
patients tend to have right lateral temporal lesions and dorsolateral prefrontal damage 
rather than the ventromedial prefrontal damage observed by Daniel Tranel, Hanna 
Damasio, and Antonio R. Damasio (Wilkinson, 2015, p. 18, see Corlett, 2019 for 
further critical discussion of the Tranel, Damasio, and Damasio study and its implica-
tions for two-factor theories).
For the sake of argument, we will allow that there may be cases in which the anom-
alous experiences are appropriately similar. Our focus will be on whether two-factor 
theories are well-motivated even given this concession. It is important to recognize 
that nobody is claiming that the sole causes of delusional beliefs are anomalous expe-
riences. There will be many causal factors along with the experiences both as part of 
the causal circumstances in which those experiences operate and causally downstream 
from the experience. Maher’s position would have been subject to easy refutation if his 
claim was that anomalous experiences are the sole cause. Already, in Maher’s talk of 
normal responses to anomalous experiences, a whole background of causal factors is 
taken into account. Two-factor theorists are claiming that, against this assumed back-
ground, an additional distinguishing factor needs to be acknowledged.
The envisaged second factor is a clinically significant abnormality relating to how 
delusional beliefs are formed or why they are retained (Langdon & Coltheart, 2000, 
pp. 201–206; Davies et al., 2001, p. 144). For example, and as noted earlier, Davies, 
Amiola Davies, and Coltheart talk of departures from what is normally the case (2005, 
p. 228). McKay, Robyn Langdon, and Coltheart talk of the second factor placing sub-
jects at the extreme end of the belief evaluation continuum (2010, pp. 316–317). Oth-
ers talk of ‘gross deviancy’ or abnormality (Chapman and Chapman, 1988, p. 179; 
Kaney & Bentall, 1989, p. 191; Stone & Young, 1997, p. 342). Everyday irration-
alities are not properly so described. Sometimes two-factor theorists just talk of irra-
tionalities in a way that would make their position no different from, but just a minor 
development of Maher’s position (e.g. Bortolotti, 2009, p. 57; Young and De Pauw, 
2002, p. 56; Stone & Young, 1997, pp. 339–344). Although the latter still emphasize 
the ‘abnormality’ of the reasoning, this doesn’t seem to be their considered view. Two-
factor theorists represent the current orthodoxy in combining an appeal to experience 
to account for the monothematic character of the delusion, while assuaging the intui-
tion that there is some additional cognitive problem with the subject.
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Talk of two causal factors in this framework involves a mix of type and token 
causal description that needs clarification. Two-factor theorists claim that there are 
two types of causal factor—individuated by location in the process of belief forma-
tion or evaluation—although they are neutral about whether they are the same or 
different kind of factor at these two locations. Corresponding to these two types of 
factor, the idea is that any subject with delusions will have tokens of the identified 
factors. These are anomalous experiences (first factor) and failures to form belief in 
the normal way, or evaluate it once formed, in the normal way (second factor). This 
distinction is important for the evaluation of the contribution of prediction-error the-
ories of perception and cognition to this debate.
Prediction-error theories hold that perceptual processing involves the generation of 
predictions about sensory input, from antecedently held perceptual hypotheses about 
the world, with the aim of updating the hypotheses to minimize the error of these pre-
dictions on the basis of comparison between the predictions and sensory input. Delu-
sions derive from the malfunctioning of this process, for example, faulty signals that 
a prediction isn’t met leading to erroneous updating. The erroneous updating persists 
in the face of counterevidence because of continuing faulty signals supporting the 
updated hypothesis, mistaken downplaying of counterevidence due to the attribution 
of a high degree of noisiness to the incoming sensory input, or the relative absence of 
other kinds of sensory input bearing on the updated hypothesis (Corlett et al., 2007, 
p. 2396; Corlett et al., 2010, pp. 355–357; Corlett et al., 2016, p. 1146).
The candidate first factor—the contents of anomalous experiences—is usually 
said to be a result of either the combination of the antecedent hypothesis plus the 
prediction-not-met signal, the prediction-not-met signal giving, say, the sense of 
strangeness (or ‘aberrant salience’) in the experiences, or the reigning hypothesis 
which is the result of the signal (Kapur, 2003; Turner and Coltheart, 2010, p. 360; 
Hohwy, 2013, p. 48). To illustrate, in a case of the Capgras delusion, we either have 
the presentation of a partner with a sense that they are unfamiliar (the prediction of 
affective response is said to be not met) or as an imposter (see Bongiorno, 2020 for 
discussion on someone being presented as an imposter in experience).
Because the source of the error leading to delusional belief—malfunctioning of 
the prediction error process—is the same, whether it holds in the early stages of 
perceptual processing or in the later stages usually thought of as cognitive, we have 
the same type of factor in play. Prediction error accounts are one-factor accounts 
in this sense. The approach is neutral over the location(s) in which the error arises. 
Although its proponents often deny a sharp perception-cognition divide, they recog-
nize the role of a more obviously cognitive place for a malfunctioning of this type. 
They conjecture that, in certain higher-level contexts, prediction error signals will be 
discounted (e.g. Corlett et al., 2016, p. 1148). Some two-factor theorists, thus, claim 
that prediction error theories are compatible with their approach and may help in its 
development (Coltheart, 2010, p. 25, see also Miyazono et al., 2014). So prediction 
error theories do not operate at the same level as the debate between one-factor and 
two-factor empiricism.
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We see that everything turns on the proper understanding of ‘normal response’. 
Sometimes ‘normal response’ is interpreted as the claim that the response to the 
experience is rational. The fact that there are some subjects who do not form the 
delusional belief upon the same anomalous experience is taken to indicate that those 
subjects who do are failing in their rationality. We consider later whether there is 
just one rational response to anomalous experience (Sect. 5.1), as well as develop-
ing the point that normal responses need not be rational ones (Sect. 5.2). There are 
irrationalities to which we are all prey. ‘Normal response’ in this extended sense 
means that subjects with delusions display no irrationality beyond the normal range. 




4  Candidates for the second factor
Monothematic delusions ‘present in isolation in people whose beliefs are otherwise 
entirely unremarkable’ (Coltheart et al., 2007, p. 642). One-factor theorists find this 
segregation from other beliefs unsurprising, tracing it to the anomalous experiences 
to which the delusional beliefs are a response. Two-factor theorists face a difficulty. 
If subjects with these delusions have some clinically significant abnormality of their 
belief formation or evaluation processes, ‘why don’t they have a whole variety of 
delusional beliefs, rather than just one?’ (Coltheart, 2015, p. 25, see also Davies 
et al., 2001, pp. 149–150). Two-factor theorists must argue that while there is a clin-
ically significant abnormality in belief formation or evaluation, this is not of such 
significance that it might give rise to delusional beliefs without persistent anoma-
lous experiences. Some cognitive failing tips a subject into delusion (e.g. Langdon 
& Coltheart, 2000, p. 212).
The explanatory challenge for two-factor theories is that they need to provide a 
perspicuous characterization of the factor that leads to this tipping over. Here they 
face an unwelcome choice. If they emphasise that the second factor must be clini-
cally significant, then the arguments they have offered in favour of a second factor 
are inadequate since all they cite in its support is that there is a variation in responses 
to anomalous experiences. We will explain how our preferred one-factor approach 
can accommodate such variation. On the other hand, if they merely highlight a par-
ticular second factor at work, which might be spread across the normal population, 
then their position is a development of Maher’s approach and not an alternative to it. 
Thus the self-image of two-factor theorists as departing from Maher will be shown 
to be either unmotivated or illusory.
With this task in mind, two-factor theories have come in, at least, three broad 
types: bias, deficit, and performance-failure theories (Bortolotti, 2009, p. 30). Some-
times theories are developed which run the first two together: there is a bias because 
there is a deficit (e.g. Coltheart et al., 2010, pp. 282–284). Biases are taken to be 
tendencies to depart from processing information in the way it should be processed. 
The relevant deficits are impairments to the normal system of belief formation, or 
subsequent evaluation, so that certain kinds of information cannot be processed 
(Bentall, 1995; Stone & Young, 1997, p. 331; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000, p. 202, 
Davies & Coltheart, 2000, p. 22). Performance-failure two-factor theorists deny that 
subjects lack the competence—thought of as a capacity—to form or evaluate beliefs 
unbiasedly (Gerrans, 2001). Instead, there is some kind of failure to put the compe-
tence into practice: a performance failure.
This categorization of the terrain raises two preliminary issues. The first is that 
the typology distinguishes theories that have different, not necessarily competing, 
aims. The most general characterization of the second factor is some departure from 
a normal response regarding belief formation or evaluation. Bias theories offer a 
more precise characterization of this departure. Deficit theories, on the other hand, 
are more concerned with what causes this departure. The corresponding causal story 
for bias theories is to talk of certain tendencies in the cognitive system. These ten-
dencies may well be, but need not be, deficits. A bias may be present, indeed built 
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in, but is not the result of impairment. Performance failure accounts provide no fur-
ther specification of the second factor but rather rule out a certain kind of characteri-
sation of it: one in terms of deficits or biases.
The second issue is whether a unitary account of the second factor is possible. 
For example, may some delusions arise from the operation of biases and others from 
deficits? The resolution of this issue has important consequences for our understand-
ing of monothematic delusions. Consider two people with Capgras delusion. Subject 
A firmly holds onto the belief that his loved one has been replaced by an imposter in 
the face of considerable counterevidence but, eventually, abandons the belief. Sub-
ject B never does. She is absolutely resistant. Suppose that subject B has a deficit 
brought about by brain injury whereas subject A had no discernible brain damage. 
There are cases of this kind and, as we shall see, some cases of monothematic delu-
sion—such as erotomania—rarely present brain damage (Sect. 4.2).
How should we view the two cases? One line might be that Subject A is not really 
a case of Capgras delusion but only an apparent one. Capgras delusion is a natural 
kind, with a hidden nature: the presence of a deficit. A second line would be that 
there are deficit and non-deficit instances of Capgras delusion. Capgras is variably 
realized. The second factor would be given a functional specification—a departure 
from a certain kind of normal relationship between experience and belief formation, 
or a failure of subsequent belief evaluation—and different realisations of this would 
be recognized. The presence of a deficit might be, but need not be, an explanation of 
the intractability of Subject B’s condition. On the other hand, what was required for 
Capgras to present was something rather less than the postulated deficit.
When we look at the nature of, and evidence for, these three types of theories, we 
need to be clear about whether it supports the claim that a particular second factor 
is an essential part of monothematic delusion or, at best characterizes some cases 
and, at worst, fails to characterize what is required for a particular monothematic 
delusion.
4.1  Bias theories
Bias theories face two immediate difficulties. First, to characterize a bias away from 
how information should be processed, you have to provide some account of how 
it should be processed in the first place. Second, biases in the formation, and/or 
evaluation, of beliefs plausibly ought to apply across the board and not just to the 
distinctive topic of the relevant monothematic delusion. This is not a problem for 
those suffering from polythematic delusions as a result of schizophrenia, and so it 
is no surprise that bias theories were first formulated in this context. By definition, 
though, it is a problem for monothematic delusions and the evidence for the pres-
ence of a bias here is correspondingly weaker.
To address the first issue, most bias theories are formulated within a Bayesian 
framework (e.g. Hemsley & Garety, 1986). To fix ideas, we shall adopt this frame-
work and discuss the different candidate biases with Capgras delusion in mind.
Bayes’ theorem holds: 
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‘e’ is for evidence, ‘h’ for a hypothesis one is testing in the light of the evidence. 
The probabilities express degrees of confidence in a proposition rather than objec-
tive probabilities. My P(heads) may be 0.5 even if the coin is, in fact, biased and 
unbeknownst to me has an objective probability of turning up heads of 0.8. Suppose 
you are considering whether or not to believe h or not-h on the basis of evidence e. 
Then the following ratio captures which is more credible. 
 If P(h/e)/P(not-h/e) is over 1, then P(h/e) is more credible.
In the application of Bayes’ Theorem to delusional reasoning, we should take ‘h’ 
as a hypothesis about what is going on, and ‘e’ the anomalous experience. So, from 
the perspective of the subject with Capgras delusion, the probability attached to the 
hypothesis that my partner has been replaced by an imposter, given the subject’s 
suffering the relevant anomalous experiences, is the probability of the anomalous 
experience in which I have flat affect looking at my partner, given the delusional 
hypothesis, multiplied by the probability of my partner having been replaced by an 
imposter, divided by the probability of the anomalous experience.
To see whether it is rational for the subject to believe that their partner has been 
replaced by an imposter, we compare:
HD: My partner has been replaced by an imposter
HR: My partner remains as before
P(HD) will often be much smaller than P(HR). Ask a subject, before the onset of 
his delusion, ‘What’s the chance of your partner being replaced by an almost identi-
cal imposter?’ and he will say very low. Consider now P(e/HD) against P(e/HR). A 
subject experiencing no affective response to what seems to be his partner, given 
that she remains as before, is also very low. By contrast, it is considerably higher if a 
replacement has occurred.
Things may, then, be quite finely balanced to begin with (or favour  HR, McKay, 
2012, pp. 339–341). This will depend upon the explanatory need if, say, the anoma-
lous experiences seem very improbable. However, the imposter hypothesis increases 
in probability as the anomalous experiences build up. Within this framework, why 
do some subjects end up with Capgras delusion and others do not?
4.1.1  Jumping to conclusions/data gathering bias
Some argue that those with delusions suffer from a ‘jumping to conclusions’ bias 
(Garety, 1991; Garety et  al., 1991). In the bead test, two jars, A and B, are filled 
with red and yellow beads in the following proportions: 85:15, 15:85 (Garety et al., 
1991, p. 196); 60:40, 40:60 (Dudley et al., 1997a, pp. 252–256). Subjects are pre-
sented with beads, one at a time, without being told from which jar they are taken, 
and replaced, and they are asked to say when they are confident that the beads 
are coming from either jar A or jar B. For example, they might see red bead, red 








bead, yellow bead, red bead, making jar A more likely. Subjects with delusions 
require fewer beads—hence the charge of ‘jumping to conclusions’— before say-
ing whether they are from A or B. Likewise, the thought runs, Capgras subjects too 
quickly attach credibility to the hypothesis that their partner has been replaced by an 
imposter, given the anomalous experiences.
Further work has shown that a more precise specification of the ‘jumping to con-
clusions’ bias is that subjects with delusions have a ‘data gathering’ bias (Garety 
& Freeman, 1999, p. 131; Dudley et  al., 1997a). Subjects with delusions display 
no difference from control subjects with respect to the estimation of probabilities 
of certain hypotheses on the basis of evidence as to frequency. They also display a 
similar way of balancing strength of evidence (e.g. all the beads being red in a small 
sample) over weight of evidence (a larger sample but some yellow beads). The dif-
ference is that subjects with delusions require fewer beads to be presented (less data) 
before they arrive at a conclusion (Dudley et al., 1997a, pp. 248–249); as do normal 
subjects rating high for delusional ideation (Linney et al., 1998, p. 299).
While there is evidence that this style of reasoning is present in schizophrenia 
detailed above, there is little evidence that it is present in monothematic delusion. 
Differences in reasoning between subjects with delusions and subjects without delu-
sions are often found not to be statistically significant (e.g. McKay et al., 2007, pp. 
368–369, Brakoulias et al., 2008, p. 157, pp. 161–162; Jacobsen et al., 2012, p. 12) 
[we have given an online page reference here because the only online version has not 
been updated to the journal pagination], or very slight (Kemp et al., 1997). The dif-
ficulties with the jumping to conclusions proposal don’t end there.
First, as its advocates note, the identified ‘jumping to conclusions’ reasoning 
style is not, in fact, a failure of rationality, characterized by the Bayesian formula. It 
turns out that, for subjects with delusions, as a group, the average number of beads 
required conforms closer to Bayesian rationality. Subjects without delusions on 
the other hand are ‘too cautious’ (Garety et al., 1991, p. 200; Garety, 1991; Maher, 
2006, p. 180).
Some respond to this point by suggesting that the crucial observation is that sub-
jects with delusions are different, from those without, even if, by the lights of Bayes-
ian rationality, not irrational (e.g. Bentall 1994, pp. 346–347). While they might be 
different, such a position does not constitute grounds for postulating a second fac-
tor. Maher does not deny that there are differences, he only denies that there is a 
clinically significant second factor to identify. Two-factor theories standardly reject 
Maher’s position taking subjects with delusions to be either irrational or abnormal 
in the sense we have specified. If subjects with delusions prove to be more rational 
by Bayesian standards, then they are covered by Maher’s position. Moreover, while 
there might be some irrationalities—for example, overoptimistic self-appraisal as 
against depressive realism—for which evolution selects, being worse Bayesian rea-
soners is unlikely to be one of them. What benefits would accrue to such a sub-
ject, especially bearing in mind the difference is strongest regarding neutral subject 
matters (see the third point below)? In any event, it would be a mistake to charac-
terize the fact that there is some difference as a bias since many are reasoning as 
they should unless, as Richard Bentall remarks, bias is taken to cover a tendency to 
‘jump to conclusions’ relative to the general population regardless of whether that 
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tendency is rational. That’s probably why other two-factor theorists deny that the 
second factor relates to belief formation as opposed to evaluation (Coltheart et al., 
2010, pp. 277–278) (see Sect. 4.2).
Second, subjects who displayed a ‘jumping to conclusions’ bias showed no 
greater tendency to stick to a conclusion come what may. As one might expect, some 
work showed that they would jump to other conclusions on the basis of new infor-
mation (Garety, 1991, p. 16, Garety et al., 1991, p. 200; Davies et al., 2001, p. 149). 
Other work found no greater tendency to stick to their conclusion than control sub-
jects (Dudley et al., 1997a, p. 257). Those jumping to the conclusion that their part-
ner has been replaced might be expected to jump to the opposite conclusion when 
faced with counterevidence such as the testimony of friends and other family mem-
bers. This is not found. Moreover, evidence that subjects with delusions show no 
more resistance to changing their mind with regard to neutral topics shows that there 
can’t be a general bias or fault in the evaluation of their beliefs.
Third, as remarked above, the principal difference between normal subjects and 
those prone to delusions is most often found in neutral topics (although not always 
reproduced, for example, Warman & Martin, 2006, p. 763; McKay et al., 2007, pp. 
368–369, Brakoulias et  al., 2008, p. 157, pp. 161–162, or very slightly so, Kemp 
et al., 1997). Since a significant number of subjects without delusions also have the 
‘jumping to conclusions’ reasoning style, at best, we have a pre-disposing factor 
which is not clinically relevant in itself but may be significant when combined with 
anomalous experiences (Dudley et al., 2015, p. 656).
In the case of non-neutral topics, for example, concerning people like themselves, 
subjects with delusions and those without both proved to be more inclined to jump 
to conclusions, with no enhanced tendency to ‘jump to conclusions’ for those with 
delusions (Dudley et al., 1997b; Kemp et al., 1997). The delusional subject matter 
of the monothematic delusions we have been considering is non-neutral. So there is 
no reason to suppose that a ‘jumping to conclusions’ bias in subjects with delusions 
showing up in neutral topics is especially relevant in the explanation of their distinc-
tive doxastic behaviour. There is some evidence that those prone to delusions are 
more likely to ‘jump to conclusions’ when the emotionally salient topic is negative 
(Warman & Martin, 2006, p. 763). In which case, the argument would have to be 
that this slight difference in emotionally salient negative cases, when combined with 
an anomalous experience, results in delusional beliefs. We would still be left with 
the puzzle of how this explains why some subjects fail to have delusions as opposed 
to a delay in the onset of delusions.
The combination of the failure to explain the persistence of delusions plus the 
relative smallness of the difference, when the difference primarily shows up, and 
how this could explain why some people fail to have delusions, throws into question 
the role of this reasoning bias.
4.1.2  Attributional styles
Subjects with delusions have also been said to have a distinct attributional style. 
Where depressed subjects look for explanations of events that find fault with them-
selves, non-depressed subjects with delusions, especially persecutory delusions, 
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externalize the source of the problem (Kaney & Bentall, 1989; Bentall 1994, pp. 
347–353). Instead of identifying a problem with themselves in their relationship 
to their partner, they say that the partner is an imposter. This has been cited as an 
explanation for how a subject can switch between Capgras and Cotard delusions 
(Wright et al., 1993). The latter comes on when the subject is depressed.
Davies and colleagues argue that a problem with this proposal is that some sub-
jects suffer both delusions simultaneously (2001, pp. 148–149; Joseph, 1986). How-
ever, not all the cases they cite support this charge. For example, RY particularly 
suffered from Cotard delusion when he awoke from sleep and was in a disorien-
tated state, unable to distinguish vivid dreams from subsequent reality. This resolved 
through the day and the most persistent delusion he had was Capgras (Butler, 
2000a). Geoffrey Wolfe and Kwame McKenzie’s case report describes a man whose 
Capgras delusion resolved with anti-psychotic medication and developed the Cotard 
delusion subsequently due to hypothesized depression (Wolfe & McKenzie, 1994, p. 
842).
Nevertheless the approach fails to have general application. While paranoiac 
subjects display the externalizing attributional style, non-paranoiac subjects with 
somatic delusions fail to have the corresponding internalizing attributional style in 
which such delusions might be rooted (Sharp et  al., 1997, p. 5). There is also an 
alternative explanation of the cases that might be rooted in an externalizing attri-
butional style, namely the observational bias discussed in the next section (Stone & 
Young, 1997, pp. 349–350).
Finally, attributional biases of all sorts—including the ones just identified—are 
spread across the normal population (Langdon & Coltheart, 2000, p. 198). These, 
and a subject’s shifting moods, will have an influence on the beliefs formed. But 
they are not characterisations of a clinically significant abnormal second factor.
4.1.3  Observational bias over conservatism
In our initial discussion of the Capgras case, we compared the imposter hypothesis 
with the no replacement hypothesis. There is, of course, a third hypothesis:
HC: I have Capgras delusion.
Why doesn’t the Capgras subject consider this possibility? There is no evidence 
of a general hypothesis testing difficulty that might make a subject pass this option 
over (Bentall & Young, 1996, p. 374). An alternative is that the subject has a ten-
dency to privilege apparent information revealed in experience—putative ‘observa-
tional data’—to ground her beliefs rather than whether the beliefs count as the most 
minimal adjustment to the rest of her beliefs (the latter often dubbed doxastic or 
epistemic conservatism (e.g. Davies & Coltheart, 2000, pp. 16–17; McKay, 2012, 
pp. 343–344)).
Some proponents of this position have argued that the observational bias is, in 
fact, an explanatory bias, or that an additional explanatory bias should be recognized 
(McKay, 2012, pp. 343–344; Davies & Davies, 2009, p. 291). One reason offered 
derives from a certain way of developing empiricist theories of delusion. According 
to endorsement approaches, the content of the anomalous experience is pretty much 
identical to the content of the corresponding delusional belief, which, therefore, is 
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an endorsement of the content of the experience. Explanationist approaches take the 
content of the anomalous experience to fall short of the delusional belief. The belief 
involves an explanatory hypothesis as to why the anomalous experience takes the 
form it does (Bayne & Pacherie, 2004b, p. 82). The suggestion is that if explanatory 
approaches are the right way to develop the empiricist position, then the bias is cor-
rectly described as an explanatory one.
This is mistake for two reasons. First, the operation of a bias towards observa-
tional data does not require that the content of the delusional belief is presented in 
experience. An explanatory connection can be the basis of the central role given 
to observational data in the formation of belief. Second,  HC also explains the con-
tent of experience. So an emphasis on explanatory adequacy does not differentiate 
between those who adopt, and those who fail to endorse, the delusional hypothesis. 
The distinction that we need is a bias in favour of the information given in experi-
ence—the observational data—and not in favour of explanations of it.
More generally, it is questionable whether this bias, however it is described, cov-
ers the formation of delusional beliefs in the way envisaged. Consider a case of ano-
sognosia where, for example, a subject denies that her left arm is paralyzed. There 
may be an absence of experienced motor failure to alert the subject to the issue. 
Nevertheless, there are also a whole range of experiences—seeing the arm inactive 
while still feeling sensation through it, failures to clap, and so on—where there is 
observational data crying out to be explained. If there is a bias at work here, it is 
not properly characterized as privileging what is observed (Davies et al., 2005, pp. 
217–227). Equally, as Davies and Coltheart point out, if subjects with delusions had 
a straightforward bias in favour of observational adequacy so understood, we would 
expect them to be taken in far more frequently by visual and other illusions. There is 
no evidence that this is so (Davies & Coltheart, 2000, pp. 25–27).
4.1.4  Biases in general
Aside from concerns about the proper generality and specification of any bias, it is 
hard to understand how subjects with delusions’ processing of information can be 
biased when they can acknowledge that others will find the beliefs at which they 
have arrived preposterous or far-fetched (e.g. Halligan et  al., 1993, pp. 164–165). 
This suggests that their competence is untouched and, indeed, that the competence 
has no in-built biases (Gerrans, 2001, pp. 167–168). It might be thought some may 
only acknowledge that their beliefs are preposterous because they recall that others 
have told them they are. However, reports of their discussions indicate them grap-
pling with the implausibility of the hypothesis which otherwise is suggested strongly 
by their experience. These subjects do not display biases elsewhere in their rea-
soning. In many ways, they reproduce the reflective evaluation of their beliefs that 
other subjects might engage in, and they are not surprised by the reception their 
belief receives. Taken together, this all suggests that they are not simply seeking to 
humour the questioner with recalled charges of implausibility but are rather getting 
there themselves. It is worth remembering that those conducting the interview dis-
cussions will not be challenging the subject with delusions (which is acknowledged 
to be counterproductive) but will rather be exploring their views about the delusory 
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hypothesis. Thus, if the subject with delusions were otherwise parroting remem-
bered charges of implausibility, they might take the situation to present the opportu-
nity to find a supporter in the interviewer. Indeed, this is such a common phenom-
enon that it has been identified as one of the two features of monothematic delusions 
with which any theory must come to grips (Davies et al., 2001, pp. 149–150).
Research into the potential biases behind monothematic delusion persists because 
it is observed that, so long as there is some such reasoning tendency at work, when 
subjects are deluded, it does not much matter if this falls within the normal range. 
Their identification is illuminating in itself. We don’t contest that this may turn out 
to be so. But the research is better divorced from the two-factor programme. There 
is no reason to suppose that bias research will turn up a single second factor to char-
acterize those subjects who form delusional beliefs as a result of anomalous experi-
ences, nor that subjects with delusions will have more extreme instances of these 
biases than subjects in the normal range (as is often assumed, Ross et al., 2015, p. 
1183; Chapman and Chapman, 1988, p. 179). Development of bias research within 
the two-factor programme tends to encourage the slide from more modest claims 
about biases to these stronger ones that is best avoided (e.g. Coltheart, 2007, p. 
1059).
4.2  Deficit Theories
Proponents of deficit two-factor accounts have tended to focus not on belief for-
mation but belief evaluation as the location of the problem (Langdon & Coltheart, 
2000, pp. 204–213, Davies et al., 2001, pp. 149–153, although sometimes a memory 
deficit is postulated, Davies et  al., 2005, pp. 230–231). Coltheart and colleagues 
hypothesise that the second factor is right hemisphere damage in the frontal lobe, 
which interferes with the belief evaluation mechanism (Coltheart, 2007, p. 1046, 
1051; Coltheart et al., 2007, p. 644). Coltheart, Langdon, and McKay go so far as to 
say it will be present in all cases of monothematic delusion (Coltheart et al., 2007, 
p. 644). Subjects with delusions form their beliefs in line with Bayes’ Theorem but 
they fail to update their beliefs, in light of evidence that they are false, as a result of 
the deficit. As Coltheart, Peter Menzies, and John Sutton put it, they fail to take the 
evidence as evidence upon which they should update their beliefs (Coltheart et al., 
2010, p. 280).
A principal motivation offered for this position is that if there is only a reason-
ing bias, rather than deficit, one would expect that the reasons against a delusional 
belief would pile up until it is abandoned, whereas subjects with delusions are very 
resistant to abandoning their beliefs (Langdon & Coltheart, 2000, p. 202). Deficit 
theorists allow that our reasoning capacities may be unbiased and otherwise intact. 
Sometimes they just propose that the deficit is an abnormal feeling of conviction 
attached to certain beliefs (Turner and Coltheart, 2010, p. 363).
A recognised prima facie problem with deficit theories is that, as we have already 
discussed, subjects with monothematic delusions often acknowledge that the beliefs 
they have are implausible, which suggests they are able to evaluate them for plau-
sibility, even while being unable to abandon them (Davies et  al., 2001, p. 150; 
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Halligan et al., 1993, pp. 161–165). In which case, the information about the plausi-
bility or otherwise of a belief must be able to be processed. It is just not acted upon.
A second problem touching on the motivation for deficit theories is that, as Colt-
heart, Langdon, and McKay later acknowledge, sufferers from Capgras delusion, 
and the like, can abandon their beliefs (Coltheart et  al., 2007, p. 646; Turner and 
Coltheart, 2010, pp. 370–371). How does this happen if the belief evaluation system 
is damaged? The preliminary response is to point out that the fact that it is damaged 
does not mean that it fails to work at all. But then it is hard to see why we have a 
deficit rather than a bias in play in which evidence piles up and the delusion is even-
tually abandoned. Revision of beliefs often occurs in conjunction with medication. 
Perhaps those who propound deficits will rely upon this feature to distinguish their 
position from a bias.
A third problem is that one of the most resistant cases of monothematic delu-
sion is not generally accompanied with evidence of damage. Primary erotomania 
potentially goes on for decades and yet no obvious neural damage has been found 
(Coltheart acknowledges that the neuropathological evidence is variable but not how 
it throws into question the motivation for postulating a deficit (2013, p. 107)). There 
are even documented cases of the Capgras delusion with no identifiable neural dam-
age corresponding to the second factor, although the same absence of response to 
familiar faces (Brighetti et  al., 2007). Obviously we don’t deny that there will be 
differences in brain function but these observations throw into question whether the 
proper way to conceptualise the differences is in terms of a deficit resulting from 
damage. It underlines the point that the proper characterization of delusion is not at 
the level of deficit but rather what the deficit realizes, a certain departure from how 
information should be processed, whether inside or outside of the normal range.
If there is damage to the belief evaluation system and anomalous experience, then 
why is there variation in, for example, who is believed to be an imposter in the case 
of Capgras? (Berson, 1983, p. 971; Ellis & de Pauw, 1994, pp. 320–321; Brighetti 
et al., 2007, p. 191). Shouldn’t all familiar faces be seen as imposters and a lot of 
other strange beliefs come along too? This suggests that there are additional motiva-
tional factors at work in a subject with delusions’ response to anomalous experience 
(McKay et al., 2010, pp. 318–319; Turner and Coltheart, 2010, p. 366). Anomalous 
experience of a father towards whom one already has ambiguous feelings is more 
readily interpreted as of an imposter. Once it is recognized that there is an additional 
differentiating factor in play, the question arises whether it may play a far more sig-
nificant role.
More recently, two-factor theorists have accepted that there may not be a defi-
cit in every subject with a delusion (e.g. Coltheart, 2005, pp. 75–76, although they 
often insist that there will be an impairment in belief evaluation in any case of delu-
sion (Coltheart, 2010, p. 23)). The reverse Othello case, erotomania discussed fur-
ther below and also, plausibly alien abduction delusions, hypothesized by some to 
be based upon hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations, are acknowledged to 
be cases where this may be so. Two-factor theorists suggest that in these cases, there 
might be a second factor at work—a tendency to find certain kinds of reasoning 
attractive involving strange causality, new age thinking etc.—which falls short of a 
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deficit (cf. Sullivan-Bissett, 2020). By our lights, this identifies a motivational fea-
ture that is better understood as an explanation of a performance failure.
4.3  Performance failure
The third kind of two-factor theory takes the second factor to be a performance fail-
ure. To illustrate the notion of performance failure in another area, Philip Gerrans 
cites failing to be able to speak, as a result of a stroke, as not a failure in one’s lin-
guistic competence but rather in the performance of it (Gerrans, 2001, p. 165).
If Bayesian belief updating is used to characterize what has been called proce-
dural rationality, then the discussion so far has done little to show that there is a 
performance failure here. Gerrans looks to a wider notion of pragmatic rationality 
that covers the evaluation of the prior probabilities of hypotheses P(e), P(h), how 
one is probable given another, P(e/h) and, one might reasonably assume, whether 
something should be taken as evidence at all. So, for example, those who suffer from 
Capgras display a performance failure of pragmatic rationality by taking the hypoth-
esis that one’s partner has been replaced by an imposter as more probable than it 
is (Gerrans, 2001, p. 164, pp. 167–168, other proponents of this position include 
Bayne & Pacherie, 2004a, p. 6).
The ground for taking subjects with delusions to have a performance failure, 
rather than a lack of competence, is that, since they recognize that their delusions 
are hard to believe, this is evidence that their competence is intact (e.g. JK, Young 
and Leafhead 1996, p. 158, discussed by Gerrans, 2001, pp. 167–171). The observa-
tion does not sit happily with the ascription of a performance failure either though. 
If subjects with delusions are capable of noticing that their belief is incredible, then 
this recognition is a successful performance of the competence (recall that a similar 
issue faced by bias theories, Sect. 4.1.4 and deficit theories, Sect. 4.2).
Moreover, characterizing the second factor in terms of performance failure is not 
an explanation of the second factor but just a description of the minimum that is pre-
sumed to occur by two-factor theorists in the case of delusion, namely that a subject 
is not forming beliefs in the way that they should. An explanation would account for 
why there was a performance failure.
We have already noted that there is an issue about why subjects with Capgras 
delusion don’t take all those people with whom they have close relations and/or are 
familiar to be imposters. For example, although RY had Capgras delusion, he only 
had it with respect to his father with whom he had had trust issues prior to his acci-
dent and the onset of Capgras (Butler, 2000a, p. 686, other cases involve a feeling 
of ambivalence, Enoch & Trethowan, 1991, pp. 11–12). If this kind of ‘psychody-
namic’ explanation is used to differentiate between those the subject does and does 
not believe are replaced by imposters, it is plausible that it is also relevant to explain 
the performance error in the first place. ‘Performance error’ is a placeholder for 
appeal to what may be quite standard individual differences—deriving from back-
ground motivations, beliefs, and context—that give rise to performance failings. On 
its face, it does not constitute an alternative account in itself.
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Appeal to motivational factors can account for why delusional beliefs are held 
extremely firmly without appeal to a deficit. An example is B.X who came to suffer 
from reverse Othello syndrome after substantial head injury which, because of his 
disabilities, led to his abandonment by his romantic partner. He claimed that she had 
remained faithful to him and they had married. In this case, the delusion seems to be 
a protective strategy to deal with the calamitous setback B.X. had sustained. It was 
eventually abandoned as he recovered some degree of independence and received 
counter-evidence in the form of a starkly honest description of the situation (Butler, 
2000b, pp. 86–88). The case nicely illustrates how a pattern of response can be irra-
tional, and thus a performance error, without obviously being abnormal.
Other features may be responsible for the belief that a specified individual is an 
imposter that are entirely neutral on the question of whether a performance error has 
taken place. For example, prior to the onset of Capgras, there is often a period in 
which the subject hasn’t seen the individual said to be replaced by an imposter and, 
sometimes, there are very slight but real changes in the individual. This, in addition, 
to a context that may be unfamiliar, or increased suspiciousness, can result in the 
delusion that an imposter has taken the place of a loved one (Fleminger, 1992, p. 
298). Lower confidence levels may be set for beliefs in accord with this suspicious-
ness, but this still constitutes a response entirely within the normal range (Fleminger, 
1992, p. 299).
Discussing with a subject their delusional beliefs can be a frustrating process. 
Consider JK who claimed that she was dead. When asked whether she could feel 
that her heart was beating, she said that given that she was dead, a beating heart was 
no sign of life, while acknowledging that other people would find this hard to believe 
(Young and Leafhead, 1996, p. 158). Nevertheless, it is not obvious that this resist-
ance is any stronger than conversations one may have with somebody who is in an 
abusive relationship, acknowledges that the facts, as they stand, indicate the abusive 
character of his partner and yet fails to believe that this is the case because of some 
dimension of his first person experience (‘if you felt like me…’) (see, for example, 
relevant discussion in Noordhof, 2003). This is a readily understood phenomenon—
one which litters the course of human relationships—which is equally likely to be 
present when a normal subject is faced with anomalous experiences.
Some may be inclined to think that a cognitive second factor is inevitably in play 
in delusions. Consider cases in which anomalous experiences do not involve halluci-
natory elements, but are characterised by a lack of something expected to be experi-
enced, for example, lack of affect. In such cases it might be argued that they involve 
something cognitive—an experience failing to meet some expectation—which is a 
second factor. But notice that this putative second factor is not clinically anoma-
lous in the reported cases. The expectation of an affective response when looking at 
our loved ones is appropriate. So it is important to keep separate that there may be 
something cognitive at work from there being something clinically abnormal.
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4.4  Characterisation of particular cases
The criticisms against the various candidate second factors have taken a number 
of different forms. In some cases, for example the ‘jumping to conclusions’ bias, 
we have questioned whether they can play the envisaged explanatory role. In other 
cases, such as observational bias, we have questioned the claim to complete cov-
erage of monothematic delusions. For deficits, there has been concern about moti-
vation, coverage, and explanatory adequacy. All of these criticisms are compatible 
with particular subjects having some of these factors at work to explain particular 
features of their monothematic delusion. For example, the intractability of some 
subject’s monothematic delusion may be due to a severe deficit in their belief evalu-
ation system. The fact that such a deficit could not explain how many subjects with 
monothematic delusions are capable of acknowledging the implausibility of their 
beliefs and revising their beliefs in certain circumstances does not vitiate the explan-
atory appeal to a deficit to explain the details of this particular case. Nothing we 
have argued rules that out. However, what is going on in a particular case should not 
be mistaken for providing insight into monothematic delusion as a distinctive kind 
of mental disorder. The candidate second factors we have identified don’t have the 
requisite generality and are not required to explain the distinctive features of such 
delusions. Focus on them distorts appreciation of the clinical significance of abnor-
mal experience to which we now turn.
5  Outline of a one‑factor theory
The experiential anomalies that subjects with delusions suffer are substantial 
(Maher, 2003, p. 18). In Capgras delusion, subjects experience a lack of affective 
response to faces, failing to experience someone with whom they are in a close rela-
tionship in the usual emotionally significant way. Evidence for this is the absence 
of any difference in autonomic response when experiencing those people familiar 
to them, and those who are not. This often seems to be a consequence of neural 
damage in the dorsal route between the visual cortex and the limbic system (Ellis 
& Young, 1990, p. 244). Similar damage seems present in those who suffer from 
Cotard delusion (Young et al., 1994). In Cotard delusion, though, it is hypothesized 
that subjects fail to experience any emotional feelings at all in response to their envi-
ronment (Young et al., 1992, p. 800). One hypothesis, as yet not tested, is that the 
failure of autonomic response is generalised. The table we gave at the beginning 
gives further examples.
The anomalous experiences to which subjects with delusions are responding are 
typically taken to be conscious by one-factor and two-factor theorists alike, though 
they need not be (e.g. Davies et al., 2005, p. 222). More recently, Coltheart, Men-
zies, and Sutton have suggested that those with Capgras delusion are not conscious 
of the activities of their autonomic system and, hence, its failure to register a famil-
iar person as such (Coltheart et al., 2010, p. 264; see also, for mirrored self misiden-
tification Davies et al., 2005, p. 224).
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One-factor theorists hold that a subject’s delusional beliefs are normal attempts to 
form beliefs in the light of these experiences (Maher, 1988, p. 22). Thus Maher talks 
of the delusional belief being held ‘because of evidence powerful enough to support 
it’ (Maher, 1974, p. 99). He claims that delusional hypotheses are best thought of as 
like scientific theories—both ‘serve the purpose of providing order and meaning for 
empirical data obtained by observation’ (Maher, 1988, p. 20). Although subjects can 
hold delusional hypotheses in the face of counterevidence, this is analogous to what 
goes on in scientific theory change (Maher, 1974, p. 107). Even better theories can 
be resisted because they conflict with a scientist’s commitment to her own theory. In 
the case of a subject with a delusion, to accept the theory proposed to supplant the 
subject’s own theory would be ‘tantamount to asking them to trust the evidence of 
other people’s senses in preference to their own’; something which is ‘not impossi-
ble’ but ‘not readily done by most people’ (Maher, 1988, p. 25, our emphasis).
Subjects with delusions might have been in a state of considerable distress prior 
to adoption of the delusional hypothesis that explains why they are undergoing such 
experiences. The adoption may bring them some relief and attendant intellectual sat-
isfaction at figuring things out (Mishara, 2010, p. 10). Normal subjects would be 
loath to give up such prizes. We need not attribute to subjects with delusions special 
resistance to having their beliefs challenged (Maher, 1974, p. 104; Maher, 2006, p. 
182). In addition, everyday subjects engage in irrational—but non pathological—
behaviour in ordinary life and scientific discovery when they do not give up their 
hypotheses easily (Maher, 1988, pp. 20–22).
Those with monothematic delusions will rightly take themselves to have experi-
ences that are largely reliable but which keep supporting a non-standard delusional 
belief. These beliefs will, by their very nature, adjust a subject’s assessment of the 
implausibility of the theory they support over time. The initial delusional beliefs are 
like a bridgehead for others.
Nothing in the statement of this approach suggests that anybody who has the 
definitive anomalous experiences must have the delusional belief as well. Two-fac-
tor theorists who take one-factor theorists to be committed in this way are making 
two assumptions. First, that for any particular anomalous experience, there is only 
one rational response to it. Second, that when Maher talks of delusional beliefs as 
a normal response to anomalous experiences, he means a rational response to the 
anomalous experiences (e.g. Bentall et al., 2001, p. 1149, Davies & Coltheart, 2000, 
p. 8, 12, Bortolotti, 2009, p. 57). For those two-factor theorists who place the sec-
ond factor in the belief evaluation process, the subjects’ response should not just be 
understood as initial response but rather initial response plus whatever occurs as a 
result of subsequent evaluation. Without these assumptions in place, the observation 
that subjects vary in the responses they make could not be taken to be an objec-
tion to a one-factor approach. A successful development and defence of a one-factor 
theory, then, has to explain how one or both of these assumptions are wrong.
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5.1  Reasonable differences in response to experience
The first defence of a one-factor theory is to challenge the idea that there is one 
rational way in which to respond to anomalous experiences or, even if there is, 
take the disagreement on this matter to be reasonable. Suppose it seems to you that 
your partner has been replaced by an imposter (because of your lack of affective 
response). For any such, surprising, content about the way the world is, another 
hypothesis is that there is something wrong with you. Is it clear what rationality 
requires here?
Bias two-factor theorists are committed to a positive answer. But is this right? 
Consider the debate between epistemological sceptics and dogmatists about per-
ceptual justification (Pryor, 2000). What is at stake here is the weight that should 
be given to experience in response to scepticism about the external world. Dogma-
tists claim that our experiences of objects and properties in the external world are 
an answer to sceptical concerns, insofar as they provide perceptual justification for 
our external world beliefs (e.g. Pryor, 2000, pp. 532–538). Perceptual experience 
bestows prima facie immediate (albeit defeasible) justification for perceptual beliefs, 
and does not give immediate prima facie justification for believing that one is in a 
sceptical scenario (Pryor, 2000, p. 536). By the same token, then, Capgras dogma-
tists experiencing the absence of affect generated by a loved one—where their expe-
riences are otherwise reliable presentations of the world—may feel that they have 
reason to dismiss claims that, in fact, they have a psychological abnormality (that 
they are in the equivalent of a sceptical scenario where their experiences are mis-
leading). Rather, they may feel that their experience of their loved one as unfamil-
iar justifies them in believing that they are in fact unfamiliar. In each case, the pre-
ferred hypothesis supported by experience faces defeaters. In the case of Capgras, 
this might take the form of the reception of that hypothesis from others. In the case 
of resistance to scepticism, the occurrence of dreams, hallucinations, illusions, and 
our putative inability to distinguish them from perception. All the phenomena that 
motivated scepticism in the first place.
Of course, just like in the debate between sceptics and dogmatists, some will pre-
fer to give less weight to experience and more to theoretical considerations that may 
throw that experience into doubt. As one patient puts it, her mother looked differ-
ent by ‘having the different inside of her […] Has their lifestyle changed? Have I 
changed? Have they changed in a funny sort of way? I don’t know. It’s weird and it 
gets confusing’ (Turner and Coltheart, 2010, p. 372).
In both cases, there is a debate about which is the rational response to the evi-
dence of the senses. Perhaps both are rational responses or perhaps there is just a 
reasonable difference over which is the rational response although one or the other 
is correct. In both cases, a story can be told about why one should be sceptical about 
the content of one’s experiences (one might be a brain in a vat or dreaming in the 
first, one might be suffering from Capgras delusion in the second) but likewise both 
kinds of subjects may insist: I recognize I cannot rule out in a satisfactory way that 
I’m a brain envatted or an abnormal subject, but still these abnormal possibilities 
do not seem like real options to me (see Sullivan-Bissett, 2018 for discussion of 
how non-delusional alternative explanations might be unavailable to subjects with 
1 3
Synthese 
delusions). As Maher says, such experiences ‘have the irreducible primary quality 
that sensory experiences generally have. They cannot be reasoned away’ (Maher, 
2003, p. 18).
Note that the dogmatic response to scepticism doesn’t conflict with epistemic 
conservatism, the idea that the very holding of a belief provides some justification 
for that belief (McCain, 2008, p. 186). If one’s set of beliefs has justification just by 
being held, then one might be inclined to make only minimal adjustments to that 
set. While the challenge of scepticism threatens more than a minimal adjustment, 
it may seem otherwise with the case of monothematic delusion. It has been sug-
gested, for example, by Brian McLaughlin that the belief that a loved one has been 
replaced by an imposter contradicts many of a person’s background beliefs (2009, p. 
143).3 But this is overstated. Not only are works of non-fantastic fiction littered with 
examples of imposters taking the place of key figures, but also there is a rich vein of 
news reports or rumours about how people are replaced by look-alikes. As we noted 
earlier, particular cases of Capgras often involve a period during which the subject 
with the delusion hasn’t seen the individual believed to be an imposter so no magical 
event is supposed in which an imposter is substituted under the subject’s very eyes. 
The belief that one is faced with an imposter is a natural adjustment in response 
to the Capgras subject’s sensory experience. This is probably why two-factor theo-
rists usually allow that the belief is a consequence of rational belief formation and 
place the irrationality in subsequent belief evaluation (e.g. Coltheart et al., 2010, pp. 
277–278).
Even here, matters are not clear-cut. For one thing, subjects with such delu-
sions are weighing the disturbance that the imposter hypothesis brings, along with 
increased suspicion about those who don’t accept it, against a view about how 
someone they believe they have feelings for, looks affectively to them. It is hard 
to underestimate how striking it is that someone looks emotionally different to you 
from the way you expect. As McLaughlin points out, when the delusory belief gets 
entrenched, epistemic conservatism may well assist its retention (McLaughlin, 2009, 
p. 150).
Equally, one of our central beliefs is that our own perceptual and cognitive pro-
cesses are working effectively. If a subject has flat affect when experiencing her 
partner, the belief that her partner has been replaced by an imposter may seem like 
a radical change in her beliefs about the world. However, consider the alternative 
belief that her perceptual and cognitive processes are not functioning properly. 
Believing this would also represent a radical change. It is not obvious that epistemic 
conservativism favours the second belief over the first. After all, the alternative 
belief has potential implications for many of her other beliefs. It is by no means 
clear how isolated they can take this to be. The point is not that the radical change 
envisaged in the belief that one’s perceptual and cognitive processes are not func-
tioning properly is scarier for the individual. It is pretty scary to imagine one’s loved 
one replaced by an imposter that everybody continues to recognize. The point con-
cerns what is potentially more radical to one’s epistemic situation.
3 This point was also emphasised by an anonymous reviewer.
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Of course a subject may entertain the hypothesis that they are suffering an 
entirely local malfunction that doesn’t threaten radical revisions of their beliefs. 
Rejecting the imposter hypothesis does not require believing that there are wide-
spread problems with their perceptual and cognitive processes. However, this more 
modest hypothesis has epistemological difficulties of its own and, from the subject’s 
perspective, has substantial explanatory costs. If their experiences are otherwise 
reliable and don’t reveal imposters everywhere, what grounds are there for suppos-
ing that a local malfunction is at work that the presentation of their senses might 
not be thought to outweigh? Likewise, the explanation of the anomalous experi-
ence provided by the imposter hypothesis is straightforward. They are faced with an 
imposter. By contrast, the hypothesis that one has Capgras delusion is a promissory 
note for an explanation which is, as yet, unclear (why that loved one?) put forward 
by an individual that they may not trust. In this respect, a more general malfunction 
of their perceptual and cognitive processes is more satisfying but is more radical in 
its implications.
Maybe these issues should be resolved one way rather than the other. But even 
if there is one weight we should give to experience, reasonable differences over 
what it is would both explain the variation in subjects’ responses and yet make those 
responses reasonable (even if one of them is incorrect). So, even if you are con-
vinced that rationality cannot support belief in the imposter hypothesis, this is not 
sufficient to undermine the first line of defence of a one-factor approach. There are 
reasonable differences over the rational response to Capgras experiences that makes 
Capgras subjects’ responses reasonable if not rational.
5.2  Normal range irrationality
The second line of defence for a one-factor theory allows that the subject’s response 
to their anomalous experiences may not be rational, but still holds that it is within 
the normal range of responses, concerning which we would not suppose that there is 
anything clinically amiss. Recall that a key motivation of two-factor theories is the 
observation that not all folk who undergo particular anomalous experiences become 
delusional. Thus there must be a second factor at work the presence of which 
explains why only some subjects adopt delusions in the face of such experiences. 
However, a one-factor theory can appeal to a normal range of responses to anoma-
lous experiences which can explain the difference without positing a clinically sig-
nificant cognitive contribution. The variation between those subjects who form, or 
persist in, delusional beliefs, and those who do not, is rather due to individual differ-
ences in intellectual style and character at work in normal belief formation.
On what grounds do we make this suggestion? On the grounds that even among 
the healthy population within which the first factor is not at work, there is a range of 
intellectual styles resulting in an array of strange beliefs. As Maher reminds us, nor-
mal members of the general population are ‘prone to believe in the Bermuda Trian-
gle, flying saucers, spoon-bending by mental power, the Abominable Snowman, and 
return to life after the out-of-body experience of death’ as well as ‘prebirth hypnotic 
age regression, multiple personalities, […] and so forth’ (Maher, 1988, p. 26).
1 3
Synthese 
We add that there are ‘at least several thousand worldwide’ (French et al., 2008, 
p. 1387) who believe they have been abducted by aliens. Key to this bizarre belief is 
that researchers interested in explaining it have not sought a cognitive abnormality, 
even whilst recognizing that there are people who have the abduction experience 
without the abduction belief. Rather, researchers have instead sought to identify a 
range of normal range cognitive styles that may help explain why some folk form 
the abduction belief and others do not (see Sullivan-Bissett, 2020 for discussion). 
There is no reason, we say, not to extend this methodology to monothematic delu-
sions in general, but doing so is a very different thing from seeking to identify a 
cognitive contribution understood as a second factor.
Obviously the line between normal irrationality and the kind of abnormality that 
requires postulation of a second factor is going to be hard to draw. This is not a prob-
lem that we face and the two-factor theorists avoid. Indeed, the burden is greater 
upon them since the second factor—a bias, deficit, or performance error—is identi-
fied as responsible for an abnormal response that differentiates those with delusions.
5.3  Epistemic responsibility
It would be better for the whole debate if we could settle on a characterization of 
normal range reasoning and, thereby, a normal range response, and its abnormal 
contrast case. A natural way of thinking about the issue is to take the relevant dimen-
sion of abnormality to involve mental processes that are significantly more resistant 
to rational correction than we would expect, in general, from the population, given 
the presence in that population of the kind of experiences which subjects with delu-
sions undergo. There are two elements to this idea (italicized above).
Normal irrationalities are those over which the subject has some responsibility 
the basis of which shows up in typical patterns of responsiveness to reasons. Normal 
subjects are irresponsible if they are insufficiently cautious in their reasoning for a 
belief. They are in possession of reasons—as the contents of other beliefs—or have 
had reasons presented to them which, had they considered them properly, would 
have led to the abandonment of the belief. Those whose irrationality is abnormal are 
not just epistemically irresponsible in this way but are outside the realm of epistemic 
responsibility. Reflection on the considerations for their beliefs would not help them 
in abandoning them, or stymie their formation in the first place.
The first element links the characterisation of normal versus abnormal irrationali-
ties to some of the things virtue epistemologists like Linda Zagzebski say. The epis-
temic vices of intellectual pride and conformity are things for which we are respon-
sible and can exercise control (Zagzebski, 1996, p. 60, see also Cassam 2015a, 
2015b).
Nevertheless, the second element is that it is undeniable that some kinds of expe-
rience may place our capacities to respond to reasons under significant pressure 
due to their disturbing character. So we need to adjust our expectations of rational 
responsiveness to the kind of experiences subjects with monothematic delusions are 
undergoing. That is the second element.
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Emphasising that subjects with delusions are, at worst, only normally irrational 
is to claim that their epistemic irresponsibility in the face of abnormal experiences 
results in delusional beliefs. There is nothing further wrong with them. It is possible 
to appeal to their reasoning powers, with some hope of success, to a comparable 
degree to debates we might enter with those prone to conspiracy theories or commit-
ted to views what about they have undergone in the workplace that might turn them 
into vexatious litigants. The only difference is the disturbing character of the experi-
ences people with delusions are undergoing.
There is evidence to support this understanding of subjects with monothematic 
delusions. For example, LU was challenged in her Cotard belief that she was dead 
by pointing out that she was still capable of motion whereas dead people she had 
observed were not. In this case, her delusion resolved and she abandoned her belief 
(McKay & Cipolotti, 2007, p. 353). Similarly, MF—who had Capgras delusion—
became convinced that his wife was, in fact, his wife when he was challenged to 
find another explanation for the fact the she was wearing their wedding ring with 
her initials inscribed upon it (Coltheart, 2007, p. 1054; Coltheart et  al., 2007, p. 
646, for another example, see Turner and Coltheart, 2010, p. 371). Studies showing 
that subjects with delusions respond to cognitive behavioural therapy, permanently 
recording a reduction in credence to their delusions are also relevant here (e.g. Bra-
koulias et al., 2008, pp. 161–163). It has also been observed that those sliding into a 
delusion of misidentification, or coming out of it, closely inquire into the nature and 
background of the suspected double showing sensitivity to rational factors in belief 
formation and later evaluation (Christodoulou, 1978, p. 70).
That does not mean that reasoning with any subject with a monothematic delu-
sion can result in them abandoning the delusional belief. Far from it! Our point is 
only that this feature of delusional beliefs (their seeming irrevisability, or the epis-
temic irresponsibility manifest when failing to revise them) is both not unique to 
delusions and those holding them, and it is also understandable given the anomalous 
experiences subjects with delusions are undergoing. That subjects with delusions are 
reluctant to give up their beliefs even in the face of disconfirming evidence, that they 
are epistemically irresponsible, is characteristic of a whole range of normal range 
beliefs. Take self-deceivers (see Noordhof, 2003 for discussion) and vexatious liti-
gants: discussing the beliefs of these folk can be just as unrewarding an experience 
and yet they fall within the normal range of subjects.
Consider also conspiracy theories, which we will understand as explanations of 
events that appeal to the intentional states of conspirators, who intended the event 
and kept their intentions and actions secret (Mandik, 2007, p. 206). Those who 
believe in such theories—so-called conspiracy theorists—are prime examples of 
epistemically irresponsible subjects whose beliefs seem utterly impervious to coun-
terevidence. As Quassim Cassam points out, ‘there aren’t too many examples of 
committed conspiracy theorists changing their minds’ (2019, p. 93). Conspiracy 
theorists are especially relevant to discussion here since, perhaps similarly to some 
monothematic delusions, ‘[t]here is almost no explanation that isn’t too bizarre for 
the conspiracy theorist’s taste’ (Cassam, 2019, p. 22). Belief in conspiracy theories 
is widespread, for example, a recent poll found that 63% of those registered to vote 
in the US buy into one or more conspiracy theories (Fairleigh Dickinson University 
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poll, 2013). But many researchers interested in conspiracy theorists make no claims 
about clinically abnormal cognition, rather, they appeal to individual differences in 
personality to explain being conspiracy-minded (see Cassam, 2019, pp. 40–43 for 
discussion) or as involving a particular worldview (Keeley, 1999, p. 123, Cassam, 
2019, p. 100). Such normal range irrationality is the kind of thing which can con-
tribute to such thinkers displaying epistemic irresponsibility. Drawing on the empiri-
cal work on conspiratorial ideation, Joseph M. Pierre notes that it is ‘essentially a 
normal phenomenon’:
Indeed, many of the cognitive biases and other psychological quirks that have 
been found to be associated with [belief in conspiracy theories] are universal, 
continuously distributed traits varying in quantity as opposed to all-or-none 
variables or distinct symptoms of mental illness. They are present in those who 
do not believe in conspiracy theories and some of them, like need for unique-
ness or closure, may be valued or adaptive in certain culturally-mediated set-
tings. (Pierre, 2020, p. 618, see Douglas et al., 2019 for a review of the litera-
ture on the genesis of conspiratorial beliefs.)
When explaining the formation and maintenance of conspiratorial beliefs then, it 
has been recognized that it is a mistake to seek to identify a single cognitive contri-
bution (abnormal or otherwise) as responsible, and talk of biases in this context is 
not used to pick out deviation from normal range, but rather departure from rational-
ity. Those biases hypothesized to play a role are ones found in the general, non-con-
spiratorial, population. As Cassam puts it, ‘[t]here is no single or simple explanation 
of conspiracy mindedness, but there was never any serious hope of that. The answer 
to the question of why people believe in conspiracy theories is: it’s complicated’ 
(Cassam, 2019, pp. 61–62). Similar things can be said for folk with monothematic 
delusions. It is a mistake of the two-factor theorist to look for a single cognitive fea-
ture (let alone a clinically abnormal one) to do the work of explaining monothematic 
delusion formation. Rather, the epistemic irresponsibility displayed by such subjects 
is representative of normal range irrationality, which, when understood against a 
background of distressing anomalous experiences, is both understandable and not all 
that surprising.
6  Two objections
One objection often raised is that, if it is found that in all cases of monothematic 
delusion, or a certain type of monothematic delusion, there is brain damage in a 
certain part of the brain, then this is compelling evidence that a second factor is at 
work.
The observation of brain damage does not establish whether we have a clinically 
abnormal deficit of the relevant kind. Even if there are consequences, these may be 
no more than shifting a subject from one kind of normal response to another. By 
analogy, brain damage that results in a change in personality, doesn’t necessarily 




We don’t deny that, if, contrary to what we have argued, there did turn out to be 
some common cognitive deficit, this would be of explanatory interest. Just as we 
would not deny that if somebody with a certain body type were especially prone to 
a certain type of disease, this would be of interest. The issue is the clinical signifi-
cance of this. Suppose the cognitive deficit were less pronounced in many subjects 
with monothematic delusions than shows up in conspiracy theorists and vexatious 
litigants. The former suffer highly anomalous experiences to which they are seeking 
to respond rather than facing more mundane features of life. It would not be appro-
priate to suppose that the candidate cognitive factor was of particular importance, 
even whilst granting its salience, in understanding monothematic delusions. The 
research orientation of two-factor theorists is otherwise. That is the point of taking 
the second factor to be clinically significant, putting such emphasis on it, and it is 
this that we say, as yet, there are no good grounds.
A second objection to the one-factor approach stems from monothematic delu-
sions in which there is no obvious anomalous experience (those marked with a ‘?’ 
in the experience column of our table presented earlier). Primary erotomania has an 
explosive onset and long term focus (the condition can last for decades) on a par-
ticular high status individual who is believed to be secretly in love with the sufferer, 
the belief being often highly resistant to alteration (Jordan & Howe, 1980, p. 980, 
pp. 984–985; Jordan et al., 2006, pp. 790–791). Ordinary experiences are interpreted 
in special ways, for example, the license plates of cars of a certain type from a par-
ticular state or the colour purple were taken as messages of love (Jordan et al., 2006, 
p. 788). In this case, the charge runs, there must be a cognitive deficit and if here, 
then why not in other cases of monothematic delusion?
A weakness in this objection is that the cognitive aspect to it is strikingly dif-
ferent, both in its explosive rather than gradual onset, and in its generation of the 
delusion without the support of anomalous experience to provide the content. Those 
more inclined to see continuities with other monothematic delusions conjecture that 
such cases may result out of an erroneous attribution of salience to events in expe-
rience (Coltheart, 2010, pp. 24–25). If the latter is correct, perhaps supported by 
motivational factors, then we have the basis for a one-factor approach to erotomania.
Such cases suggest two ways in which one-factor theories may be developed fur-
ther. First, primary erotomania often arises after some emotional trauma such as 
divorce, with a previous history of difficult relationships with family members of an 
older generation of the opposite sex, a sense of relative social isolation, and suspi-
ciousness. This may plausibly generate a motivational framework in which certain 
combinations of everyday experiences are misinterpreted, resulting in future experi-
ences of events being given inappropriate salience that serve to enmesh a subject 
further in delusory beliefs. The distinctive tie to anomalous experience is loosened.
Second, the recurrent talk of suspiciousness suggests an extension of the notion 
of experience to mental modules which display many of its distinctive features, espe-
cially that of relative informational encapsulation: that is, other beliefs don’t tend to 
influence or moderate what is presented to be the case. Thus, Joel Gold and Ian Gold 
have proposed that a malfunctioning suspicion system, which enables subjects to 
detect threatening intent, is at the root of many delusions (Gold & Gold, 2014, pp. 
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191–197). Erotomania is suggested to be a motivated response to absence of social 
status and the consequent threat perceived as a result of this.
7  Conclusion
Two-factor approaches have proven attractive because they capture the role of 
experience but recognize the intuitive thought that delusions involve some abnor-
mal cognitive failing. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the arguments in their favour 
don’t work. The second factor has proven extremely elusive and may prove neither 
abnormal nor unified. By contrast, one-factor theories provide a plausible and uni-
fied treatment of the nature of monothematic delusions. As a result, the one-factor 
approach should be treated as the default hypothesis. Unless there is substantial the-
oretical reason from the study of subjects with delusions to postulate a second factor 
it should be the way we approach understanding such subjects.
One-factor theories also offer an important difference of emphasis. They see sub-
jects with delusions as, to an extent, victims of experience and motivational factors. 
Anomalous experiences can be particularly hard to resist. However, at the end, we 
saw how experience does not have to be anomalous to result in a delusion. Rather a 
sequence of experiences that unlocks a motivational generation of a particular belief, 
can then result in anomalous interpretations of experiences which are presented as 
obvious further support for the belief. The debate between one-factor and two-factor 
theories is not then, simply, a debate about classification and demarcation. It is a 
debate over delusional entrapment and the role of experience in shaping our mental 
lives. These are dangers we are otherwise prone to underestimate by loose talk of a 
second factor.
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